

**Honolulutraffic.com notes on the *Project Management Oversight Contractor Report*. Jacobs Engineering Group. October 2011 (FINAL). 330 pages.**

... this is an extremely large project, and historically such projects are found to exhibit high-risk profiles ... the remaining work on this project extends into increasingly dense urban areas, increasing the risk of third-party interferences and unexpected underground utility and archaeological conditions. (p. 13)

Note: the Project History on p. 20 does not list the Transit Advisory Task Force.

If the WOFH contractor is not successful in obtaining the GPRM site for its precast yard, a substitute site must be identified, which could result in changes to the environmental documentation to reflect a substitution. (p.84)

One known issue to date is the acquisition of the required property to establish a concrete pre-cast facility. (p. 86)

The WOFH DB Contractor intends to utilize an existing facility (GPRM Prestress) for pre-casting and prestressing of the concrete guideway segments. This facility was identified in the ROD. The contractor is negotiating with the owner and the current lease-holder to obtain use of the property. However, if the GPRM facility is secured, another facility will be required. Any impacts to the budget and/or schedule cannot be assessed until a decision is made on the site to be used for pre-casting activities. If another site is selected, the grantee is aware that it must coordinate with FTA to determine the extent of any environmental documentation that may be required. (p. 94)

Certainly, necessary elements such as the need for a precast yard (either on island or on the mainland) will affect pricing and create scheduling issues because of the permitting process required. (p. 169)

Environmental documents may be required due to scope changes that may not be covered in the FEIS and may cause delays to the project. (Particularly the Casting Yard)

Decision is still pending regarding the casting yard. This risk would also be applicable to Airport and CC in regards to other possible locations for casting yard.

Issue is still ongoing. Kiewit to provide the required documentation for the sites they have located (Grace and Harbors Point) along with other identified sites that were considered not an option. Once received, the documents will then be forwarded on up to the FTA for further review.

KHG's proposal states that it will use the same area as the casting yard for WOFH. (Project Risk Register, p. 19)

Unanticipated litigation may add cost to the Project (e.g. protests from adversary groups, community groups, adjacent landowners, and other affected parties) (Project Risk Register, p. 20)

**Security concerns not accounted for.**

“It is notable, and of no small concern, that neither the grantee’s specifications nor AJHV’s [Ansaldo] proposal specifically mention the essential fare inspection/enforcement role that is critical to stem fare evasion with the proof of payment fare regime. Fare inspection/enforcement in NOT included in the steward’s job description. It is implied that fare inspection and enforcement may be handled by the municipal police force.” (pp. 57-8)

“The grantee’s specifications imply that the grantee will be responsible for crime fighting and fare enforcement. Staffing levels for that function are indentified in the grantee’s plans. The

grantee should not underestimate the staffing and diligence necessary to administer an defective fare-evasion prevention program.” P. 68.

Cost risk

*Project Management Oversight Contractor Report*. Jacobs Engineering Group. October 2011 (FINAL).

“If numerous iwi are found constituting a burial ground, the location could be eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, which could require realignment of guideway.” Risk Register #112.

“Halekauwila Street has very limited space, and if additional relocation is identified from what is currently planned, either rerouting or additional ROW may be required.” Risk Register #113.

May be “insufficient utility company resources”. Risk Register #11a, 11b, 11d, 11e.

The following table is on page 241:

**Table 69. Risk Model Data**

Phase	10%	50%	90%	Mitigation Target	Grantee YOE Stripped Estimate
FD	4,824,572,829	6,097,454,503	7,370,336,177	5,576,601,640	4,117,329,761

A review of the base YOE estimate values is presented in Table 70. The grantee’s estimate of \$4,982.9 million includes a contingency of \$865.6 million, yielding a grantee YOE estimate without contingency of \$4,117.3 million. With PMOC adjustments, the PMOC recommended estimate without contingency is \$4,169.4 million.

Our note: Estimates given here are without contingency or financing costs. The risk spread as of four months ago was a 90% chance that final costs would be between \$4.8 billion and \$7.4 billion before financing costs and \$5.0 billion and \$7.7 billion with financing costs. Little has happened in the last four months to change this calculation. The question here for HART and the City Council is: What is the plan in the event final costs are \$7.7 billion?

Miscellaneous concerns:

“The system will be the nation’s first driverless metro.” P. 58. See: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_driverless\\_trains#North\\_America](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_driverless_trains#North_America)

Ansaldo will be given a great deal leeway in vehicle design, etc.

“To date, the grantee has not met a milestone date on its schedule, partially due to aggressive project advancement management techniques, uncontrolled outside political influences, and technical capacity (recruiting-hiring-retention) challenges.” P. 210

Comfort concerns

“Each two car train is projected to hold 318 passengers (64 seated, 254 standing).” p. 29. [That is 80 percent standing.]

“The assumption that peak passengers will stand for as many long trips as forecast is also questionable. Given that the forecast average trip length on the Project is twice the length of the typical U.S. rapid transit journey, it is possible that standards based on industry averages may not be appropriate to attract and retain the volumes for traveler forecast to use the system.” p. 39.

“The expectation that passengers in Honolulu would be willing to endure such long trips standing on crowded trains may not be realistic. Substantial fractions of the forecast ridership base may chose (sic) to avoid the system under such conditions.” P. 72.

pp. 44-45 and fig. 9, make the case that the forecast average ride length will be the longest of any in U.S. excluding only BART. Only three lines comes close to the Honolulu Project, they are BART, PATCO and Miami, each of which has twice the seating capacity and a commensurate reduction in standing room, and thus a reduction in total capacity.